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An Evaluation Model for Assessing the Suitability of Public Private Partnership 
(PPP) Projects 
Abstract 
This paper presents an evaluation model which can be used for assessing the suitability of 
Public Private Partnership (PPP) projects by studying their attractive and negative factors.  
A questionnaire survey was conducted with industrial practitioners in Hong Kong.  The 
respondents were requested to rank the importance of fifteen attractive factors and 
thirteen negative factors for adopting PPP.  From the rankings, the relative weightings of 
each factor were derived.  The weightings of these factors formed the basis for the 
evaluation model presented in this paper.  The Hong Kong Zhuhai Macau Bridge 
(HKZMB) was used to demonstrate how this evaluation model could be applied.  From 
the list of attractive and negative factors the authors selected those which were 
foreseeable in the HKZMB project.  By calculating the total weightings of each group of 
factors it was found that the negative factors outweighed the attractive factors by 27%.  
Their relative scores were 3.58 and 2.81 respectively.  The result indicated that PPP 
would not be a suitable method for delivering this project.  To make further improvement 
in the current model, additional attractive factor “Uplift public image” and negative factor 
“Suspected public private collusion” were derived from the analysis of this case.  The 
evaluation model presented in this paper can help both the public and private sectors to 
assess whether potential public projects are suited for PPP.  Academics are also shown 
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how their research work could be delivered to a wider audience and applied in more 
practical applications within the industry. 
CE Database subject headings:  Infrastructure, Partnerships, Private Sector, 
Procurement. 
Introduction 
The success of implementing Public Private Partnership (PPP) projects in places such as 
Western Europe, the United States and Australia has been an attractive alternative for 
procuring public works projects instead of the usual traditional methods.  With benefits 
such as risk transfer, increased efficiency and innovation, and private financing 
governments around the world are keen to encourage PPP projects.   
Hong Kong is not completely new to the PPP idea.  Back in the late sixties several Build 
Operate Transfer (BOT) projects were conducted.  These were mainly transportation type 
projects.  Unfortunately, not all of these were equally successful hence the 
implementation of PPP projects have decelerated since.  Another reason for the slow 
adoption of PPP is that the Hong Kong Special Administration Region (HKSAR)
government has been able to enjoy a budget surplus for many years running.  Hence, 
providing for their own public projects has not been a problem.  In other jurisdictions that 
first adopted PPP, often their motives have been finance driven.  But with the matured 
development seen across the world and the in-depth research conducted, the other 
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advantages of PPP are even more obvious.  The public sector is also aware that in many 
cases they cannot deliver projects as efficiently and effectively as the private sector.  The 
private sector is able to introduce efficiency, skills, innovation, technology, motivation, 
finance and most importantly a share of the project risks.  On the other hand, the public 
sector is best dealing with administrative matters.  Similarly, the private sector is also 
interested in public works projects as they tend to be of large scale.  And as business 
persons they are keen to become players within this circle. 
Unfortunately, a string of recent projects in Hong Kong linked with PPP have received 
much opposition.  Debates have been going on for many years for certain projects to 
whether they should be procured by the PPP model.  In other cases, projects have been 
heavily criticised for over benefiting the private consortium.  Some cases have even 
changed from originally being procured by PPP to opting for more traditional methods.  
These obstacles have heavily discouraged both the public and private sectors from 
considering the PPP model.  Although so, the Efficiency Unit of the HKSAR has been 
continuously working on PPP related research.  Some of the local government 
departments have also continued to use different forms of PPP such as Design Build 
Operate (DBO).  Obviously this shows that there are still many in Hong Kong who has
faith in the PPP model.  
Although Hong Kong has not rejected PPP, undoubtedly the local practitioners lack 
knowledge on how to assess the suitability of PPP projects hence they have become 
reluctant to do so.  Therefore, an evaluation model for assessing the suitability of PPP
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projects is necessary. Being aware of this need, this paper presents an evaluation model 
for assessing the suitability of PPP projects by evaluating the attractive and negative 
factors of projects being considered.  A weighting for each group of factors will be 
derived and used to assess the suitability of using PPP for specific projects.  This 
evaluation model acts as a simple and effective guideline for both the public and private 
sectors.  The development of this evaluation model is believed to benefit the construction 
industry at large, as well as introduce new opportunities. 
Development of the evaluation model 
Step 1 Establish the weighting of attractive and negative factors 
Questionnaire design and administration
An empirical questionnaire survey was undertaken in Hong Kong from October 2007 to 
December 2007 to analyse the attractive and negative factors of adopting PPP. The 
questionnaire template designed by Li (2003) in the United Kingdom was adopted.
Although a new research questionnaire could be developed, there were several 
advantages foreseeable to adopt Li’s (2003) survey questionnaire rather than designing a 
new template.  Firstly, the value of Li’s (2003) questionnaire has already been recognized
by the industry at large.  His publications as a result of the research findings derived from 
the questionnaire are evidence of its worthiness.  Secondly, there would be no added 
advantage to reinvent the work that has previously been done by other researchers.  And 
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thirdly by administering Li’s (2003) questionnaire in different administrative systems, it 
would be of interest for comparison purposes in the future.  In addition, Hong Kong is 
traditionally influenced by the British, so the construction practice is very close hence no 
problems in adopting this questionnaire would be anticipated. Therefore, Li’s (2003) 
questionnaire was adopted for this survey with prior permission obtained from the author 
Dr. Bing Li and his doctoral research supervisor, Professor Akintola Akintoye. 
Selection criteria for questionnaire respondents
The target survey respondents of the questionnaire included all industrial practitioners 
from the public, private and other sectors.  Target respondents were selected based on 
two criteria: 1) They must possess adequate knowledge in the area of PPP; and 2) They 
must have hands-on experience with PPP projects, or experience in conducting PPP 
research or have followed very closely with the development of PPP. Survey 
questionnaires were sent to 95 target respondents in Hong Kong.  It was anticipated that 
some of these target respondents would have colleagues and personal connections 
knowledgeable in the area of PPP to participate in this research study as well; hence some 
of the respondents were dispatched five blank copies of the survey form.  A total of 34 
completed questionnaires from Hong Kong were returned representing a response rate of 
36%.   
Background of questionnaire respondents
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The questionnaire respondents comprised experienced practitioners from the industry.  As
shown in Figure 1 approximately half of the respondents in Hong Kong possessed 
twenty-one years or above of industrial experience.  Figure 2 provides a breakdown of 
questionnaire respondents who have been involved with PPP projects.  Given the few 
BOT/PPP projects conducted in Hong Kong, it was a surprise to find that 33% of the 
respondents gained previous experience.  Without doubt some of these may have had 
experience with local BOT projects or PPP projects overseas, but still the experience of 
these respondents confirmed the quality of the responses from the survey conducted.  In 
addition, amongst those respondents who have acquired experience with PPP projects, 
10% had previously been involved with at least five projects.   
Insert FIGURE 1 here. 
Insert FIGURE 2 here. 
Assessment of attractive and negative factors by questionnaire respondents
The respondents were requested to rate their degree of agreement against each of the 
identified attractive and negative factors according to a five-point Likert scale (1 = Least 
Important and 5 = Most Important).  The mean rating of each factor was used as their 
relative weighting to develop the evaluation model. 
Step 2 Analyze the potential PPP project 
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A thorough analysis of the potential PPP project being considered should be conducted.  
Aspects of the project which should be studied include: history, development, future, 
parties involved, view of general public, preference of public and private sector, normal 
practice, advantages and disadvantages, political situation, timeframe, opportunities, 
obstacles, culture etc. These types of information can be sourced from newspapers, 
magazines, governmental reports and websites, studies conducted by researchers, private 
sector publications, interviews with parties involved or parties that would be affected, 
discussions with experts, questionnaire survey with the general public etc.  The user of 
the evaluation model will match the project information available to the list of attractive 
and negative factors.  For each factor the user will then assign a score for the likelihood it 
would occur in the project being considered.  The score will be given according to the 
same Likert scale used by the questionnaire respondents.  
Step 3 Evaluate the decision for adopting PPP 
The total score for the attractive and negative factor groups can be derived by the sum of 
multiplying the relative weighting of the factor (which is the mean score given by the 
questionnaire respondents) by the score of the factor (this is the score given by the user of 
the evaluation model). The total score can be expressed by the following formula: 
TS = ? W x S         (1) 
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TS = Total score of factor group (attractive or negative factor group) 
W = Weighting of individual factor within the factor group 
S = Score assigned by user for individual factor within factor group 
The total score of the group of attractive factors will be compared with that of the group 
of negative factors.  The group of factors that scores the highest indicates the suitability 
of adopting PPP for the project being considered.  For example, if the total score of the 
attractive factors is higher then PPP is the preferred option.  Whereas, if the total score of 
the negative factors is more dominant then PPP is not recommended. 
Weighting of the attractive and negative factors 
The attractive and negative factors for adopting PPP were assessed by respondents from 
Hong Kong.  The means for each factor were calculated and ranked in descending order 
of importance. 
Ranking of attractive factors for adopting PPP 
Fifteen attractive factors for adopting PPP were rated by the respondents.  The findings 
showed that the top three attractive factors ranked in Hong Kong were: 
(1) Provide an integrated solution (for public infrastructure / services); 
(2) Facilitate creative and innovative approaches; and 
(3) Solve the problem of public sector budget restraint. 
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The first and second attractive factors ranked by Hong Kong respondents show that 
efficiency-related attractive factors are considered more importantly.  Although financial 
drive in general is a major reason for adopting PPP, these respondents did not rank it as 
the top attractive factor.  Since Hong Kong has enjoyed abundant financial reserve in 
hand and budget surplus over the past few years, these have allowed Hong Kong to pay 
for their public works projects upfront (as quoted by the Secretary for Development, 
Development Bureau of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) at the 
CIB TG72 Symposium on Revamping PPPs held in Hong Kong on 28 February 2009).
The government officials generally did not see the need to borrow money when they 
could provide the cash cheaper.  Hence efficiency is a more important attractive factor 
that could really induce Hong Kong to adopt PPP.   
The first attractive factor ranked in Hong Kong is “Provide an integrated solution (for 
public infrastructure/services)”.  PPP is an integrated solution in that a private consortium 
is responsible for all the functions of design, building, financing, operation and 
maintenance.  This bundling can allow the partners to take advantage of a number of 
efficiencies and increase economies of scale and scope (European Commission 
Directorate, 2003).  For instance, the contractor’s detailed knowledge of the project 
design and the materials utilized allows it to develop a tailored maintenance plan over the 
project life that anticipates and addresses needs as they occur, thereby reducing the risk 
that issues will go unnoticed or unattended and then deteriorate into much more costly 
problems.   
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The second attractive factor ranked by respondents from Hong Kong is “Facilitate 
creative and innovative approaches”.  This observation manifests that Hong Kong has a 
large urge for having creativity and innovation in PPP projects.  Practitioners in Hong 
Kong have expressed in public the need and importance for creativity and innovation in 
PPP projects (Kwan, 2005; Ho, 2005).  
The third attractive factor rated by respondents from Hong Kong “Solve the problem of 
public sector budget restraint”.  The financing of public sector projects has been 
recognized as one of the key initial driving forces for implementing PPP schemes 
internationally.  Many experienced practitioners in PPP believe that PPP brings about 
many other attractions besides financing, and that financial motivations should not be 
taken as the sole reason for adopting PPP.  However, financial reasons are frequently the 
initial attractive factors for administrative systems adopting PPP.  This financial attractive 
factor is undoubtedly very appealing for governments across the world especially when 
public money is to be spent amongst competing needs.  Therefore, it is not surprising that 
both groups of respondents have rated this attractive factor highly, but with a subtle 
difference in emphasis.   
The mean values for the attractive factors as rated by Hong Kong respondents ranged 
from 2.94 to 3.79.  This observation has reflected that the variation in their responses are 
relatively small, only 0.85.  This finding shows that the Hong Kong respondents rated the 
fifteen attractive factors consistently.
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As the respondents were asked to rate the fifteen attractive factors according to a Likert 
scale from 1 to 5, a value above “3” would represent that the attractive factor is of 
importance.  Amongst the attractive factors only one was ranked below “3”.  This 
attractive factor was “Technology transfer to local enterprise” which scored “2.94” and 
was also ranked bottom.  This is probably because the immediate results of this attractive 
factor could not be seen and therefore the other fourteen attractive factors were relatively 
more important.  The other fourteen attractive factors were rated a score between “3” and 
“4”.
In addition, on top of those factors the respondents were asked to rate, they were also 
given the opportunity to add others which would be of importance, but they did not do so. 
Ranking of negative factors for adopting PPP 
Thirteen negative factors for adopting PPP were rated by the survey respondents.  The top 
three negative factors ranked by Hong Kong respondents included: 
(1) Lengthy delays because of political debate; 
(2) Lengthy delays in negotiation; and 
(3) Very few schemes have actually reached the contract stage (aborted before contract).  
In Hong Kong, public works projects are often delayed and complicated by the need for 
public consultation; hence it is not surprising that “Lengthy delays because of political 
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debate” was the highest negative factor ranked by the Hong Kong respondents.  This 
problem is well known for causing projects to be held back.  For example, the West 
Kowloon Cultural District project has been cited as a typical example in Hong Kong 
where political interference has caused the project to be on hold for many years (Chan et 
al., 2007a).  Initially there was much political debate within the Legislative Council as to 
whether this project should proceed as a PPP, especially whether the whole project with 
an estimated cost of US$25 billion (So, 2009) should be handled by one single 
consortium instead of half a dozen number of consortia each sharing the pie.  The local 
government was also alleged to be unclear of the long-term policy and objectives for this 
cultural development project, causing much criticism from the general public.   
Ranked second by respondents in Hong Kong was “Lengthy delays in negotiation”.  This 
finding has shown that “Lengthy delays in negotiation” are typical for PPP projects 
irrespective of geographical locations.  Due to the size and complexity of PPP projects 
the procurement process has been know to be lengthy.  This can be said to be a typical 
feature of PPP projects, therefore only projects that are of appropriate value and 
worthiness should consider PPP.  
The third negative factor as ranked by Hong Kong respondents was “Very few schemes 
have actually reached the contract stage (aborted before contract)”.  The high ranking of 
this factor coincides with the previous argument about political debate in Hong Kong.  As 
a result some projects had to be aborted due to political disagreement.   
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For the negative factors rated by respondents in Hong Kong the mean values ranged from 
2.79 to 3.82.  The variation in responses was 1.03.  Similar to the variation in responses 
observed for the attractive factors, the difference is very small.  Hence, it can be 
concluded that the respondents rated the factors consistently. 
Also, similarly to the rating of the attractive factors, the respondents were asked to rate 
the thirteen negative factors according to a Likert scale from 1 - 5, therefore a value 
above “3” would represent that the negative factor is of importance.  The results show 
that in Hong Kong there were two negative factors below a score of “3”.  These negative 
factors were “Less employment positions” and “Reduce the project accountability”,
which both scored only 2.79. 
In addition, on top of those factors the respondents were asked to rate, they were also 
given the opportunity to add others which would be of importance, but again like for the 
attractive factors they did not do so. 
Agreement of the survey respondents  
Kendall’s concordance analysis was conducted to measure the agreement of different 
respondents on their rankings of attractive and negative factors based on mean values 
within a particular group. If the Kendall’s coefficient of concordance (W) carries a pre-
defined significance level of say 0.05, a reasonable degree of consensus amongst the 
respondents within the group on the rankings of obstacles was indicated.  As shown in 
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Table 1, the W value for the rankings of attractive and negative factors is 0.071 and 0.094 
respectively. For the attractive factors the computed W is significant with p = 0.008.   
According to Siegel and Castellan (1988), W is only suitable when the number of 
attributes is less than or equal to 7.  If the number of attributes is greater than 7, chi-
square is used as a near approximation instead.  The critical value of chi-square is 
obtained by referring to the table of critical values of chi-square distribution, which can 
be found in Siegel and Castellan (1988).  For this study as the number of attributes 
considered are above seven, the Chi-square value would be referred to rather than the W 
value.  According to the degree of freedom, the critical value of Chi-square is 23.680 and 
21.030 for the attractive and negative factors respectively and the computed Chi-square 
value is above the critical value of Chi-square (29.907 and 35.968 respectively).  
Therefore the assessment by the respondents within the group on their rankings of 
attractive and negative factors is proved to be consistent.  This finding ensures that the 
completed questionnaires were valid for further analysis. 
Insert TABLE 1 here. 
The suitability of using PPP for the Hong Kong Zhuhai Macau Bridge 
Background of the Hong Kong Zhuhai Macau Bridge
The proposed design
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The Hong Kong Zhuhai Macau (HZMB) is believed to further enhance the economy 
development of Hong Kong, Macau and the Western Pearl River Delta region (Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region Government, 2008).  The new bridge is expected to 
significantly reduce the cost and time for both people and goods transportation between 
the regions.  At the same time it is hoped that the project will increase the region’s 
competitiveness. The construction of the bridge is expected to commence no later than 
2010 (Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government, 2008). And the estimated 
completion date is set for year 2015 to 2016 (Chen and Lee, 2008). 
The initial estimated time of travel is believed to be within 15 to 20 minutes and the total 
cost of the bridge will be approximately RMB37.4 billion (Mak, 2008).  The main bridge 
will be a 29.6 kilometers dual 3-lane carriageway in the form of bridge tunnel structure 
comprising an immersed tunnel of about 6.7 kilometres.  Vehicle speeds are anticipated 
to be 100 kilometers per hour. A traffic flow of approximately 12000 – 16000 vehicles 
are expected per day (Hung, 2008).  The bridge will land on an artificial island off 
Gongbei on the west side, and another artificial island on the east which would be west of 
the HKSAR boundary.  According to the current proposed construction option, the 
connecting roads are about 12.6 kilometers on the Hong Kong side and 13.9 kilometers
on the Mainland side. The bridge will run across the Lingding Channel, the Tonggu 
Channel, the Qingzhou Channel, the Jiuzhou Port Channel, and the Jianghai Channel etc.
(Transport and Housing Bureau, 2008a).  
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The original PPP decision
The HZMB project was originally suggested by the private sector hence PPP was the 
assumed delivery method from the very beginning.  A PPP plan was originally drawn up 
in early 2008 for the bridge.  This plan was officially initiated by the three governments 
from Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macau in 2002. Under the PPP scheme, the three 
governments would be only responsible for construction of ports and connective parts of 
the bridge within the three sides and its main part will be constructed by bids (Qiu, 2008).
Under the PPP arrangement the bridge was to have a 50 year concession period 
(Legislative Council, 2008). 
Another reason for the HZMB to be delivered by the PPP model was the high project 
costs.  By involving the private sector the governments would not need to take up the 
financial risks involved (Apple Daily, 2008).   
Changing from private financing to public financing
The idea for the HZMB was first proposed by Mr. Gordon Wu of the Hong Kong listed 
Hopewell Holdings Limited in the eighties (Kwok, 2009).  Mr. Wu’s original initiation of 
the project led minds to think that Hopewell Holdings would definitely be interested to 
participate in this mega infrastructure project but it has been reported that over twenty 
years after the idea was first proposed, the company no longer saw a business opportunity 
in the plan (Lam and Chan, 2008).  Similarly, other private sector companies felt the 
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same.  The private sector was no longer interested in this project as the business potential 
for them was not attractive. 
Therefore, the decision for the financing model of the bridge was changed dramatically.  
In the “8th AWCG Meeting” held in February 2008 it was still assumed that the project 
would be procured by PPP.  The three governments agreed to take up the responsibility 
for construction and operation of the boundary crossing facilities and the link roads to the 
bridge within their own territory. It was discussed that private investment would be 
invited for the main body of the bridge with the funding gap shared by the three 
governments according to construction needed in their own territories.  In this 
arrangement Hong Kong would have covered 50% of the difference, Guangdong 35% 
and Macau 15%. The decision showed that the governments wer  in favour of the PPP
arrangement at the time (Transport and Housing Bureau, 2008b). 
But in an interview conducted with the Secretary for Transport and Housing Bureau also 
in February 2008, she was asked by reporters whether the PPP method would be adopted 
for the HZMB.  The Secretary responded that the project would be considered as a whole 
amongst the governments.  Her response did not directly answer whether the project 
would be financed by the private sector or not (Transport and Housing Bureau, 2008c). 
Under some discussion and reviews of the studies that have been carried out such as on 
the traffic flow and bid price, it was realised that the governments would not be able to 
come up with an attractive economic package for the private sector to be interested (Ming 
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Pao Newspaper, 2008a).  Finally a decision was made at the “11th Plenary of Hong 
Kong-Guangdong Co-operation Joint Conference” in August 2008.  It was announced 
that the HZMB would be funded jointly by the governments (Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region Government, 2008).  It was confirmed that the bridge would be 
conducted using public money rather than private sector resources.   
The preliminary proposed contribution from each government will be RMB6.75 billion 
from the HKSAR government, RMB7 billion from the Guangdong-Central government,
and RMB1.98 billion from the Macau Special Administrative Region government. The 
total contribution from the three governments will be RMB15.73 billion, which will be 
equal to 43% of the bridge's construction cost.  The remainder will be financed by bank 
loans (Information Services Department, 2008a). 
The new arrangement has meant that the Guangdong government has become the largest 
stakeholder of the project (Hong Kong, Guangdong and central government and Macau 
government will take up approximately 43%, 45% and 13% respectively of the upfront 
payments (Lam and Lai, 2008)).  In the original proposal the HKSAR government would 
have taken this role.  The move for this change can be an indication that the Chinese 
government has high desire to push the project ahead.  But there has been no 
comprehensive answer from the governments why the PPP arrangement was not opted 
for the bridge. (Chen and Lee 2008) 
Attractive factors of the Hong Kong Zhuhai Macau Bridge
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Maximize financial resources
To the government, PPP frees up fiscal funds for other areas of public service, and 
improves cash flow management as high upfront capital expenditure is replaced by 
periodic service payments and provides cost certainty in place of uncertain calls for asset 
maintenance and replacement.  Public sector projects delivered via the private sector 
normally involve private sector funding.  Consequently, the public funding required for 
public services can be reduced and redirected to support sectors of higher priority, e.g. 
education, healthcare, community services, etc. (Li et al., 2005b; Efficiency Unit, 2002).
Given this observation “a. Solve the problem of public sector budget restraint” was given 
a relatively low score of “1”, whereas “c. Reduce public money tied up in capital 
investment” and “n. Non recourse or limited recourse to public funding” were both given 
a score of “3”.
Improve economic development
Mr. Wu had observed the added advantages towards industry with improved 
infrastructure network in the Pearl River Delta Region.  But no further actions were taken 
by the HKSAR government hence the project was put on hold for over two decades   
(Oriental Newspaper, 2008).   
Journal of Management in Engineering. Submitted August 17, 2009; accepted July 16, 2010; 
         posted ahead of print July 19, 2010. doi:10.1061/(ASCE)ME.1943-5479.0000044
Copyright 2010 by the American Society of Civil Engineers
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt 
No
t C
op
ye
dit
ed
It was not until September 2002 that the project was rethought.  At the “Third Meeting of 
the Mainland / Hong Kong Conference on the Co-ordination of Major Infrastructure 
Projects” it was agreed that a study would be conducted on the transportation between 
Hong Kong and Pearl River West. This was the first proper study conducted to analyse
the feasibility of the HZMB.  Furthermore, in January 2003, the National Development 
and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the HKSAR government commissioned the 
Institute of Comprehensive Transportation to conduct this study. The study was 
completed in July 2003.  The report entitled “Transport Linkage between Hong Kong and 
Pearl River West” highlights that transportation between Hong Kong and the Pearl River 
West is insufficient.  A point which was mentioned over twenty years ago but only 
verified till now.  The current transport between theses jurisdictions via the Humen 
Bridge is costly and time consuming.  Therefore, the report concluded that the HZMB
would be advantageous to overcome the problems (Transport and Housing Bureau 2008a).
Given the evidence provided the following attractive factors were all awarded a relatively 
high score of “4” for their likelihood of occurrence in this project if PPP was to be opted:
“b. Provide an integrated solution (for public infrastructure / services) ”; “j. Benefit to 
local economic development ”; “k. Improve buildability”; and “l. Improve 
maintainability”.
Reduction in time and cost
Public sector projects delivered by the PPP model can often be completed on time and 
even with time savings because the consortium would start receiving revenue once the 
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facilities/services are up and running.  Therefore, the project team is keen to complete 
design and construct as quickly as possible.  Once it starts to accrue revenue it can begin 
to pay off the initial costs and build up profits, whereas in a traditionally procured project 
there are no extra financial incentives for public servants to deliver projects faster. As a 
result, projects can best be proceeded along as scheduled (Akintoye et al., 2003;
Efficiency Unit, 2003a; Environment, Transport and Works Bureau, 2004; Grimsey and 
Lewis, 2004; Li, 2003). Therefore, “d. Cap the final service costs” was given a high 
score of “4”, “f. Reduce the total project cost”, “i. Reduce public sector administration 
costs” and “o. Accelerate project development” were all given a score of “2” and also “g. 
Save time in delivering the project” was given a score of “1”. 
Increase innovation
The factor “e. Facilitate creative and innovative approaches” was also given a score of 
“3”.  Innovation is another important advantage that the private sector can bring to public 
services.   Generally speaking, the public sector may not be as innovative as the private 
sector.  The private sector on the other hand is continuously searching for new products 
and services to increase their competitive edge and to save costs (Akintoye et al., 2003; 
British Columbia, 1999; Chan et al., 2006; Efficiency Unit, 2002; Efficiency Unit, 2003a;
Environment, Transport and Works Bureau, 2004; Li et al., 2005b; Li, 2003; New South 
Wales Government, 2006). With regard to the local situation the attractive factor “m. 
Technology transfer to local enterprise” was given a score of “2”. 
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Risk transfer
The attractive factor “h. Transfer risk to the private partner” was given a score of “3”.  
Risk transfer is one of the main reasons for adopting the PPP approach.  The private 
sector is in general more efficient in asset procurement and service delivery and as a 
result it is to the government’s advantage to share the associated risks with the private 
sector.  In line with widely accepted principles, Hong Kong government’s Efficiency 
Unit (2003a) advocated that the most ideal situation is to allocate the risk to the party 
most able to manage/control that risk.  For example, the contractor would take up the 
construction risk, the designer would take up the design risk, the government would take 
up environmental approval risks, land acquisition risks etc. (Akintoye et al., 2003; 
Boussabaine, 2007; British Columbia, 1999; Chan et al., 2006; Corbett and Smith, 2006; 
Efficiency Unit, 2002; Efficiency Unit, 2003a; European Commission Directorate, 2003; 
Grimsey and Lewis, 2004; Ingall, 1997; Li et al., 2005a; Li, 2003; New South Wales 
Government, 2006; So et al., 2007; United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 
2004).
Negative fa tors of the Hong Kong Zuhai Macau Bridge
Project accountability
The Cross City Tunnel project of Sydney which was delivered by the PPP model faced 
many problems.  Due to the inaccurate traffic forecasts and the high toll prices which 
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were applied to overcome the low traffic volume, both the consortium and the New South 
Wales Government were highly criticised for this project (Jean, 2006).  Similarly if high 
tolls and low usage are experienced by the HZMB, the situation would in turn limit the 
cooperation between the three jurisdictions and also demean the objective of the bridge.  
As a result the governments may be reluctant to deliver large infrastructures jointly again.
Given evidence from previous experiences “a. Reduce the project accountability” was 
given a score of “3”.
Financial risks for the private sector
The governments were also aware that the private sector lacked motivation for this 
project.  As the bridge was found to be highly costly and uneconomic, the appeal to the 
private sector even with compensation would be difficult to attract (Van der Kamp, 2008).  
Bearing these facts in mind the negative factors “b. High risk relying on private sector”
was given a score of “3”.
A major reason why the West Harbour Crossing in Hong Kong was so unsuccessful 
compared to the Cross Harbour Tunnel also in Hong Kong was because it was built 30 
years later and at a cost of twenty-three times more.  Similarly it has been 25 years since 
the idea for the HZMB was first mentioned, the cost of construction and the necessity for 
the bridge has definitely changed.  The lack of interest from the private sector maybe an 
indication that the bridge is not as important as it once was.  The original intention was 
that the bridge could serve the industrial development of the area rather than the general 
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public.  But since the idea was first proposed undoubtedly there has been a large change 
and movement to the industries in the region.  Therefore, the negative factors “g. High 
participation costs” and “h. High project costs” were both given high scores of “4”. 
Lack of government commitment
With the comfortable reserve from all three governments there has been less drive to 
force the project as a PPP.  A string of recent projects in Hong Kong have also been 
linked with PPP but none of these have actually gone through with the idea e.g. the West 
Kowloon Cultural District.  The HKSAR government has shown to be indecisive on the 
procurement methods to be used hence there is a chance that their views could also affect 
the Guangdong and Macau governments, therefore “c. Very few schemes have actually 
reached the contract stage (aborted before contract)” was given a score of “3”. 
Lengthy delays
Lengthy delays would be one of the main concerns if the HKZMB was to be delivered by 
PPP.  The Chief Executive of Hong Kong, Donald Tsang spoke publicly at the “11th 
Plenary of Hong Kong-Guangdong Co-operation Joint Conference” in Guangzhou during 
August 2008 on the advantages for the HZMB to be funded jointly by the governments.  
He explained that for the governments to take up the financing responsibility would speed 
up the construction works of the bridge.  This argument was also agreed by Chen (2008) 
who claimed that the project would be delivered two years earlier than the PPP approach 
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which normally would require a lengthy consultation period and complicated legislative 
requirements.   
The extended duration of the tendering and negotiation process due to the project being a 
PPP was foreseeable.  Also the differences in legislation between the three jurisdictions, 
made it even more difficult to come up with a unique agreement on aspects such as 
vehicle flow and sharing of risks between the public and private sectors.  As a result to 
continue with the PPP plan would mean that the timeframe for the project would be more 
unpredictable and a lot further away (Apple Daily, 2008).   
The governments’ decision in this project has also been supported by some of the media.  
If the project continued as a PPP, the private sector would need to prepare a bid based on 
their financial benefits in which they will take in to account their expenditure for the 
project, the traffic forecast and the toll price.  Bid preparation is a lengthy and costly 
process in PPP type projects (Zhang, 2001).  If the governments are to find that their 
proposals are unsuitable, the process for the project would be further extended.  Similar 
situations as the Kai Tak Cruise Terminal in Hong Kong could arise.  From the evidence 
available, the negative factors “d. Lengthy delays because of political debate”, “i. A great 
deal of management time spent in contract transaction” and “m. Lengthy delays in 
negotiation” were regarded as highly foreseeable for the HKZMB hence were given the 
maximum score of “5” for likelihood of occurrence. 
High charges for the general public
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Another problem foreseeable if the project was to be delivered by the PPP model would 
be the high toll fees that may be imposed.  The private sector are profit making
organisations, hence they would adjust the toll fees so that they can cover their 
expenditure acquired during the delivery and maintenance of the project.  In addition, 
they will hope to seek reasonable financial rewards.  In doing so there is a risk that the 
project would follow in the footsteps of the East and West Harbour Crossings in Hong 
Kong (Apple Daily, 2008).  These projects were procured under the BOT model, 
controversy to the Cross Harbour Tunnel (Hong Kong’s first and probably most 
successful BOT project) they suffered much bad publicity due to the high and 
continuously increasing toll prices.  As a result, the general public has tended to use the 
cheaper Cross Harbour Tunnel more frequently than the other two tunnels for the 
crossing between Hong Kong Island and Kowloon Peninsula.
In the case of the HZMB, the general public could also choose to travel on cheaper routes 
if the prices were to be too high.  Studies showed that the HZMB would not be 
commercially viable hence that would mean that the governments would have to cover 
the financial costs if the bridge was to be delivered by PPP (Brown, 2008).   If the private 
sector was to be involved they would be left with no choice but to raise the toll process 
incredibly to compensate for their expenses acquired as in the case of the East and West 
Harbour Crossings (Apple Daily, 2008).   
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Originally calculations showed that if the bridge was procured by the PPP model the toll 
fares would be approximately $150 for each vehicle crossing the bridge (Mak, 2008), but 
whether this price will be lowered due to public financing is still unknown (Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region Government, 2008).  Chairman of the Container 
Transportation Employees General Union, Mr. Chiu spoke publicly that the toll fees 
should be lowered between the range HK$80 to HK$100 to be reasonable for the general 
public (Mak, 2008).  Another local Hong Kong car rental enterpriser believed that for 
such a short journey the fare should not be beyond HK$100 to HK$120.  The responses 
show that the proposed toll prices would be far too high for the general public to benefit 
from the project. 
So (cited in Ming Pao, 2008b) conducted an analysis on the probable toll fees under 
different financing models.  Three different scenarios are considered.  The first and 
second scenarios estimates the toll fee for crossing the HZMB, with the project financed 
by the host governments according to a 120 year and 60 year investment return period 
respectively.  Other factors considered in the estimation include the savings from the 
private investor’s profits if the project was to be financed by the PPP model, and also the 
estimated annual usage of the bridge.  The toll fees estimated per trip were RMB$193 and 
RMB$387 for the first and second scenarios respectively.  The third scenario considers 
the project under the PPP model.  The investment return period was set at 30 years which 
is also a typical concession period for PPP type projects (Howes and Robinson, 2005).  
Other factors considered in the estimation also included the estimated annual usage of the 
bridge.  Under this scenario the toll fee was calculated to peak RMB$830 per trip.  
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Analyses of these scenarios have illustrated that the use of the PPP financial model 
(Scenario 3) may be 2 (Scenario 2) to 4 times (Scenario 1) more expensive than if it is 
funded primarily by the government. Therefore “e. Higher charge to the direct users”
was also given the maximum score of “5”.
Allegation of collusion between the public and private sectors
There are also other advantages that have been perceived of the new arrangement.  Chen 
and Lee (2008) quoted from a Hong Kong academic that the new arrangement will
minimise the chance of negotiation between developers and the governments; hence will 
reduce allegation of collusion between business and the government.  Hong Kong has 
previously been criticised for favouring certain developers and giving developers high 
financial returns through delivering public projects.  An example is the Cyberport project 
a technological centre and the West Kowloon Cultural District a proposed cultural hub 
(both in Hong Kong) (Wong, 2005).  Given the previous experiences of Hong Kong “k. 
Confusion over government objectives and evaluation criteria” was given a score of “2”
and “l. Excessive restrictions on participation” was given a score of “3”.
Other negative factors
Other negative factors include those related to staffing issues and lack of experience or 
skills.  Although no related information was sourced for the HKZMB project, these 
negative factors may possibly be foreseeable.  Therefore both “f. Less employment 
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positions” and “j. Lack of experience and appropriate skills” were both given a score of 
“2”. 
Final assessment of the HKZMB 
With the identification of the weightings for the attractive and negative factors of PPP, 
these could be identified as checklists for assessing the suitability/feasibility of using PPP.  
If the attractive factors are prevailing in a given project scenario, the use of PPP will be 
more positive.  Conversely, if the negative factors are dominant PPP might be considered 
as unsuitable. Tables 2 and 3 summarize the assessme t of the HKZMB according to 
their calculated weightings. The findings show that the attractive factors scored between 
0.06 and 0.30, whereas the negative factors scored between 0.13 and 0.45, indicating that 
on average the negative factors were more prevailing.  The highest scoring attractive 
factor was found to be “b. Provide an integrated solution (for public infrastructure / 
services)” and the highest scoring negative factor was “d. Lengthy delays because of 
political debate”.  As discussed in previous sections of this paper, these factors are well 
supported with much evidence. The total scores for the attractive and negative factors in 
respect of the HKZMB are 2.81 and 3.58 respectively.  This result shows that the 
negative factors are much more dominant than the attractive factors by 27% hence PPP is 
not the suggested procurement method for the HKZMB. 
Insert TABLE 2 here. 
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Insert TABLE 3 here. 
Additional attractive and negative factors 
The attractive and negative factors discussed in this paper were derived from a 
comprehensive literature review and verified by previous researchers.  Their relevance 
and appropriateness was also confirmed from data collected in the United Kingdom and 
Hong Kong.  The survey respondents were also given the opportunity to suggest 
additional factors to ensure that the ones already derived were representative for PPP 
projects.  Nevertheless, the questionnaire surveys sought opinions on PPP projects in 
general and not for particular projects. Therefore it is still anticipated that there may be
additional factors depending on the case being considered due to the uniqueness of each 
project.  As a result of the HKZMB analyses, there are a couple of additional factors 
which should also be considered if a proper evaluation model for assessing the suitability 
of PPP for this case was to be conducted. 
From the case analyses of the HKZMB, the attractive factor “Uplift public image” should 
also be considered.  If the public image of a project can be uplifted as a result of being 
delivered by PPP then this should be an additional attractive factor which needs to be 
considered.  The analyses demonstrated how the general public’s opinion was also vital 
in reflecting a project’s success. In the case of the HKZMB its public image had dropped 
immensely due to the lengthy discussion regarding the financing options.  The support 
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from the general public is vital as they also represent the future end users of the facilities 
and services.   
One recent argument over PPP projects in Hong Kong is whether they are giving the 
private sector too much financial benefits in return of providing the services and facilities.  
The media have often portrayed news regarding the existence of public private collusion.
The HKZMB did not attract much private interest, providing a more attractive business 
case would not have been evitable. But due to the continuous hyped up critique of 
providing private sectors with unreasonably high economical benefits, the government 
has been careful to avoid such allegations.  In this case, the government was able to avoid 
these as they paid for the project themselves.  Therefore, the negative factor “Suspected 
public private collusion” should also be included as one of the negative factors.
The HKZMB case study has shown that at different time and stages, the attractive and 
negative factors may vary slightly depending on the project it is applied for and its 
geographic location. 
Conclusions 
This paper presents an evaluation model for evaluating the suitability of PPP projects.  
Using this model potential PPP projects can be assessed and assigned a score for their 
attractive and negative factors.  The HKZMB was used to demonstrate the feasibility of 
this model.  The results show that the negative factors outweigh the negative factors of 
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this project hence the use of PPP to deliver this project would not be recommended.  This 
suggestion also falls in line with the actual decision made by the host governments of this 
project. This evaluation model has presented a system for users to analyze whether 
potential public projects should be procured by PPP.  Although the evaluation model was 
developed based on a questionnaire survey conducted in Hong Kong, having defined the 
weighting of the attractive and negative factors of PPP, this method could be easily 
replicable and applied in other jurisdictions.  The method presented is believed to be 
useful for both the public and private sectors especially during the early stages of project 
evaluation. 
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Figure 1 Histogram showing the number of years of working experience in construction 
ndustry for the Hong Kong survey respondents 
Figure 2 Histogram showing the number of PPP projects the Hong Kong survey 
espondents have been involved with 
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Table 1 Results of Kendall’s concordance analysis for the attractive and negative factors 
of PPP 
Attractive 
factors
Negative   
factors
Number of survey respondents 30 32
Kendall's coefficient of concordance (W) 0.071 0.094
Chi-square value 29.907 35.968
Critical value of Chi-square 23.680 21.030
Degree of freedom (df) 14 12
Asymptotic significance 0.008 0.000
Note: For the attractive and negative factors only 30 and 32 respectively out of 34 
responses were suitable for subsequent statistical analyses
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Table 2 Mean scores and rankings for the attractive factors of PPP  
Attractive Factors
N Mean Rank Weighting
Assessment of the HKZMB
Likert scale 
assessment Score
a. Solve the problem of public sector budget restraint 34 3.65 3 7.16% 1 0.07
b. Provide an integrated solution (for public infrastructure / services) 33 3.79 1 7.43% 4 0.30
c. Reduce public money tied up in capital investment 33 3.48 6 6.82% 3 0.20
d. Cap the final service costs 34 3.26 10 6.39% 4 0.26
e. Facilitate creative and innovative approaches 34 3.74 2 7.33% 3 0.22
f. Reduce the total project cost 33 3.09 14 6.06% 2 0.12
g. Save time in delivering the project 34 3.21 13 6.29% 1 0.06
h. Transfer risk to the private partner 34 3.65 4 7.16% 3 0.21
i. Reduce public sector administration costs 33 3.39 8 6.65% 2 0.13
j. Benefit to local economic development 34 3.56 5 6.98% 4 0.28
k. Improve buildability 33 3.24 11 6.35% 4 0.25
l. Improve maintainability 34 3.32 9 6.51% 4 0.26
m. Technology transfer to local enterprise 34 2.94 15 5.76% 2 0.12
n. Non recourse or limited recourse to public funding 34 3.21 12 6.29% 3 0.19
o. Accelerate project development 34 3.47 7 6.80% 2 0.14
Total 51 100:00% 42 2.81
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Table 3 Mean scores and rankings for the negative factors of PPP 
Negative Factors N Mean Rank Weighting
Assessment of the HKZMB
Likert 
scale 
assessment
Score
a. Reduce the project accountability 34 2.79 12 6.60% 3 0.20
b. High risk relying on private sector 34 3.09 10 7.31% 3 0.22
c. Very few schemes have actually reached the contract stage (aborted before contract) 34 3.41 3 8.07% 3 0.24
d. Lengthy delays because of political debate 34 3.82 1 9.04% 5 0.45
e. Higher charge to the direct users 34 3.26 9 7.72% 5 0.39
f. Less employment positions 34 2.79 13 6.60% 2 0.13
g. High participation costs 34 3.35 5 7.93% 4 0.32
h. High project costs 34 3.03 11 7.17% 4 0.29
i. A great deal of management time spent in contract transaction 34 3.29 6 7.79% 5 0.39
j. Lack of experience and appropriate skills 33 3.27 8 7.74% 2 0.15
k. Confusion over government objectives and evaluation criteria 34 3.41 4 8.07% 2 0.16
l. Excessive restrictions on participation 34 3.29 7 7.79% 3 0.23
m. Lengthy delays in negotiation 33 3.45 2 8.17% 5 0.41
Total 42.25 100:00% 46 3.58
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